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Summary
Comparatively little is known about the inherited
primate background underlying human cognition,
the human cognitive ‘‘wild-type.’’ Yet it is possible to
trace the evolution of human cognitive abilities and
tendencies by contrasting the skills of our nearest
cousins, not just chimpanzees, but all the extant great
apes, thus showing what we are likely to have in-
herited from the common ancestor [1]. By looking at
human infants early in cognitive development, we
can also obtain insights into native cognitive biases
in our species [2]. Here, we focus on spatial memory,
a central cognitive domain. We show, first, that all non-
human great apes and 1-year-old human infants ex-
hibit a preference for place over feature strategies for
spatial memory. This suggests the common ancestor
of all great apes had the same preference. We then ex-
amine 3-year-old human children and find that this
preference reverses. Thus, the continuity between
our species and the other great apes is masked early
in human ontogeny. These findings, based on both
phylogenetic and ontogenetic contrasts, open up the
prospect of a systematic evolutionary psychology
resting upon the cladistics of cognitive preferences.
Results and Discussion
To examine spatial memory strategy across the Homini-
dae, we compared the performance of all four nonhu-
man great apes (henceforth, apes), prelinguistic human
infants (1-year-olds), and human children (3-year-olds).
We used a simple object-search task in which subjects
had to choose between using a place- or feature-based
strategy. An experimenter (E) distributed three con-
tainers open side up on a table. All three containers
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Deutscher Platz 6, 04103 Leipzig, Germany.had distinct rich featural attributes. Subjects observed
while E produced the reward and inverted all the con-
tainers, so that one of the containers hid the reward.
The apparatus was then occluded, and two of the con-
tainers were switched out of sight of the participant.
In the feature condition, the reward moved with the
distinctive container; in the place condition, the reward
remained in its original place, now under a different con-
tainer. The place and feature conditions were adminis-
tered in two consecutive blocks for each individual,
counterbalanced for order across subjects. The transi-
tion between the two blocks was unmarked—that is,
the strategy that had yielded rewards in the prior block
suddenly no longer did, and the alternative strategy
was now the winning one. Randomly interleaved within
both blocks were control trials in which all containers
stayed in their original location (the no switch condition).
After these manipulations (w7 s after presentation),
the occluder was raised, and the subject chose one of
the three containers (no correction allowed) and got the
reward, if any, under it (Figure 1 and Movie S1 in the
Supplemental Data available online).
Twenty-five apes of four different species belonging to
all three nonhuman great ape genera—Pongo, orangu-
tans (Pongo pygmaeus); Gorilla, gorillas (Gorilla gorilla);
and Pan, bonobos (Pan paniscus) and chimpanzees
(Pan troglodytes)—were tested with this apparatus. In
addition, twenty-six human prelinguistic infants between
12 and 13 months were tested, along with the same
number of three-year-olds (for subject and analysis de-
tails, see Experimental Procedures). In a comparison of
the average number of correct trials, results showed,
first, no significant differences in strategy preference
among ape genera (see Analysis Details below), so
they were grouped to compare them with the two human
groups. All three remaining groups showed clear prefer-
ences between the two strategies (ANOVAS: for apes,
F2,46 = 33.30, p < 0.001; for 1-year-olds, F2,48 = 7.90, p <
0.01; and for 3-year-olds, F2,48 = 18.27, p < 0.001; for de-
scriptive statistics, see Figure 2 and Table S1). However,
the three subject groups (apes, 1-year-old infants, 3-
year-old children) differed in their strategy preferences
(Figure 2). Both 1-year-olds and apes performed better
when the food stayed in the same location regardless
of the movement of the container (i.e., in the place condi-
tion) than when it moved with its container (both p < 0.01,
paired t tests). In contrast, three-year-old subjects per-
formed better at retrieving the reward when it moved
with the container (i.e., in the feature condition) than
when it stayed in its place (p < 0.05, paired t test). Figure 2
presents a summary score obtained after subtracting the
respective chance levels for percent correct scores in
the place and feature conditions. A more detailed analy-
sis looked at subjects’ choice of strategy rather than their
correct performance. We classified the subjects’
choices as place based, feature based, or errors (i.e., nei-
ther the selected location nor the container had been
rewarded before occlusion). An analysis of choices at
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error data. Comparison of frequencies of strategies
adapted on trial 1 showed that distribution of first-choice
strategy in older children differed significantly from
those of 1-year-olds (Fisher exact test, p < 0.001) and
apes (Fisher exact test, p < 0.001), which were in turn
very similar to each other (Fisher exact test, p > 0.5).
Whereas 3-year-old children tended to use a feature
Figure 1. Experimental Conditions
(Top) Adult orangutan male performing the task. (Bottom) Experi-
mental conditions. The X indicates the hidden reward before and
after occlusion. Place: During occlusion, the experimenter (E)
switches two containers while the reward stays in its original loca-
tion. Feature: E again switches two containers during occlusion
but moves the reward with its container.
Figure 2. Strategy Preferences: Performance
Mean percent correct (6 SE) for the place and feature conditions
only. Means are adjusted for the respective chance levels of the dif-
ferent subject groups: 33.33% for 3-year-old human children and
nonhuman great apes (1 out of 3 containers) and 50% for 1-year-
old human infants (1 out of 2 containers). Conditions marked with
* were significantly different from chance in one-sample t tests.
Unmarked bars were not significantly different from chance (see
Analysis Details).strategy on their very first switch trial, apes and 1-year-
olds initially chose place (Figure 3). Overall, the perfor-
mance of young human infants and all other hominid
genera showed a similar pattern, which differed substan-
tially from that observed in older, human children, who
preferred to use feature rather than place information.
Conclusions
All species feeding upon dispersed resources in space
and time need to remember locations and know how
to find them. There are two main strategies for remem-
bering object location: the use of object features and
the use of place features as defined by a spatial frame
of reference. Earlier studies have examined the use of
place and feature cues in a range of species from gold-
fish to pigeons, humans to rats. In tasks that allow the
subject species to freely combine both kinds of cues,
all tested species seem able to use both kinds according
to circumstance, although some seem able to combine
both more readily than others [3]. However, in tasks
that oppose the two kinds of cues, some species prefer
place-based strategies (e.g., fish [4, 5], lizards [6], rats
[3, 7], and dogs [8]), whereas others predominantly use
feature-based strategies (e.g., toads [9], chicks [10],
and human children [11]). No studies, however, have
systematically tracked these preferences across the
phylogenetic tree. Here, we investigated a complete
family, systematically examining this particular cogni-
tive preference across all the extant genera in the Hom-
inidae (see Figure 4, bottom), including humans at two
different ontogenetic phases.
We show that all nonhuman great ape genera share
a preference for locating things in space in terms of
abstract place or position rather than in terms of the
features of a container object. Indeed, the continuities
between human and ape spatial cognition are striking:
Apes and humans show similar ontogenetic develop-
ment across the Piagetian stages up to stage 6 [12],
commit similar errors [13], and can cope with a variety
of object displacements [14–16]. Here, we have shown
that at 1 year of age, humans exhibit just the same spa-
tial-cognition biases found in all other genera of the
family (Figure 4). The standard method of comparative
cognition thus suggests a common phylogenetic inher-
itance of a preference for place-based spatial strategies
from the ancestor shared by all four genera. Object-
location memory is a central cognitive function underlying
more complex foraging behavior. Hence, this finding is
Figure 3. Strategy Preferences: First Choice
Percentage of subjects choosing to use either place or feature cues
to retrieve the reward on trial 1 of the experiment (before receiving
any feedback).
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record—it suggests dominantly place-based foraging
strategies in the common ancestor of the Hominidae,
which may thus have foraged in rather different ways
than modern human hunter-gatherers: Place-based
strategies are highly effective for foraging within a stable
territory; feature-based strategies are advantageous for
foraging in novel environments (e.g., finding mushrooms
close to trees of a particular species). Thus, strategy
preferences might indicate foraging and lifestyle prefer-
ences. Through a comparative analysis of cognition
across a complete phylogenetic clade, we have been
able to reconstruct in our common ancestor behavioral
preferences that cannot be found directly in the fossil
record.
We also find that human infants share the same cog-
nitive preference as apes, but this changes into a prefer-
ence for features during early human ontogeny. Why
should three-year-old children differ in their preferred
spatial strategy from human infants and other great
apes? One possibility is that 1-year-old human infants
(as well as apes) lack certain cognitive abilities that are
needed to solve a feature-based search task (e.g., re-
sponse inhibition [17] or exhaustive search strategies
[18]) and that excel in humans after the first year of life.
However, in previous experiments, various animal spe-
cies [4, 19] and human infants [20, 21] demonstrated
Figure 4. Strategy preferences across the Hominidae
Mean percent correct (6 SE) for the place and feature conditions for
all nonhuman great ape genera and human 1- and 3-year-old chil-
dren. Means are adjusted for the respective chance levels of the
different subject groups (see Figure 2). No statistics were computed
for the separate nonhuman genera because of relatively small sam-
ple sizes in some of the groups. Qualitatively, Pongo, Gorilla, and
Pan, as well as 1-year-old human infants, all display a similar pattern.
In contrast 3-year-old infants show the opposite preference. Below
is the phylogenetic tree displaying the evolutionary relationships
among the four Hominid genera (Pongo, Gorilla, Pan, Homo). The
photographs display individuals of four representative species. All
five extant species of Hominids participated in the reported study:
orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), gorilla (Gorilla gorilla), bonobo (Pan
paniscus), chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), and human (Homo sapi-
ens). Here, we assume a taxonomy based on monophyletic groups.
In this framework, Hominidae include all the great apes including
humans but not the Hylobatidae or small apes.the ability to use feature cues to retrieve hidden targets.
In fact, all of our subject groups tended to improve on
their dispreferred strategy at least when it was rewarded
in the first block of trials. Alternatively, the preference for
place over feature cues for spatial memory in 1-year-
olds and apes might not be due to a lack of ability to
solve the feature condition, but to a proclivity to use
place- over feature-based strategies whenever avail-
able. In that case, the switch in humans would be due
to reconstructive events in human ontogeny between
the first and the third years, events that reweigh prefer-
ences, not create abilities. Clearly, this is a period where
much happens in cognitive development. Maybe most
prominently, infants are inducted into social life through
the acquisition of interpersonal skills [22], such as, for
example, increasing understanding of others’ mental
states and the acquisition of spoken language, the com-
bination of which opens up the full affordances of human
culture [23]. Language in particular has long been ar-
gued to play a reconstructive role in human cognitive
development [24–28]. Indeed, the first words learned
by German children are nouns [29], and nouns specifi-
cally name bundles of object features, thus making fea-
tural specificity prominent. In fact, previous research
has shown naming to draw attention to featural distinc-
tions between objects in young infants [26]. Further ex-
perimentation would be needed to demonstrate a causal
role for language for the present task, e.g., by examining
infants of the same age but different language capac-
ities. What the present data tell us is that the ‘‘wild-
type’’ in our family exhibits a proclivity for place over
feature in spatial tasks, and that humans reverse this
early in childhood.
Experimental Procedures
Apparatus
An imitation hollow stone, an imitation bird’s nest, and a hollow
piece of wood were used as containers. All were approximately
15 cm wide and placed on a plastic plank (703 40 cm) 20 cm (center
to center) apart. An opaque plastic screen (70 3 40 cm) or a dark
curtain was used as an occluder. Apes received grapes or slices
of banana as rewards, whereas children received small toy animals
that they collected in a bag and returned at the end of the session.
The toys used as rewards with 1-year-olds were slightly bigger
than those for older children to avoid risk of swallowing. All subjects
were verbally encouraged for a correct choice, and children that did
not immediately produce a response were prompted with the words,
‘‘Can you find it? Show me!’’ There were no other verbal instructions.
Participants
We tested twenty-six 3-year-olds with a mean age of 42 months
(range: 38–46 months, mean [M] = 42.3; standard deviation [SD] =
1.9) in local kindergartens. Twenty-six human infants approximately
1 year old with a mean age of 54 weeks (range: 52–56 weeks; M =
54.3; SD = 1.3) were recruited from the local community. In the two
groups, there were 12 girls and 14 boys each. All children were native
German speakers of normal ability range and came from mixed so-
cioeconomic backgrounds. We also tested twenty-five apes: five
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), four gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), five bo-
nobos (Pan paniscus), and 11 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). There
were nine males and 16 females ranging from 5 to 32 years of age. All
apes were housed at the Wolfgang Ko¨hler Primate Research Center
at Leipzig Zoo (Germany). They were living in social groups with con-
specifics and had access to indoor and outdoor areas. During test-
ing, the apes were fed according to their daily routine four times
a day on a diet of fruit, vegetables, and monkey chow; water was
at their disposal at all times.
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For older children and apes, each block was composed of six trials
of one of the two test conditions (place or feature) and three no
switch trials. Thus, subjects received 9 trials per block in two con-
secutive blocks for a total of 18 trials. We had to modify the proce-
dure for younger children because pilot testing had revealed that
they presented a strong bias toward choosing the middle position
[13]. To avoid this problem, we removed the central cup from the
setup. As a result, they received four trials per block in the two-con-
tainer setup (two place trials, two feature trials, and two no switch
trials each). We videotaped all trials and scored the container se-
lected by subjects. Some trials were excluded from analysis on
one or more of the following grounds: (1) The response was blocked
from view on video; (2) the subjects left their hands close to one of
the response places during occlusion, thereby biasing themselves
toward a place-type response (1.9% of all trials excluded in total);
(3) three 3-year-olds were excluded because they performed at least
one block without a single correct no switch trial, and one additional
3-year-old was excluded because of experimenter error; (4) six
1-year-olds were excluded because they did not complete all
trials. The sets of subjects reported above are the final sets, after
exclusions.
Analysis Details
First, we analyzed the differences among ape genera. A mixed
ANOVA with condition (place/feature/no switch) as within-subject
factor and genera (Pongo/Gorilla/Pan) as between-subject factor re-
vealed significant main effects for condition (F2,44 = 17.78, p < 0.001)
and genus (F2,21 = 3.73, p < 0.05). There was no significant condition3
genus interaction (F4,44 = 1.325). No simple post-hoc comparisons
between genera reached significance. In tendency, Pan (M = 64.9;
standard error [SE] = 2.5) outperformed Gorilla (M = 52.9; SE = 5.0)
andPongo (M = 54.0; SE = 4.5). Because we could not detect any dif-
ferential preferences for one strategy over the other between gen-
era, we collapsed all apes for further analysis. (Table S1 presents
the percentage of correct trials in the three conditions for the
remaining three groups).
A mixed ANOVA (condition [place/feature/no switch] 3 order
[place first/feature first]) conducted for each group (apes, 1-year-
olds, 3-year-olds) separately revealed a significant main effect of
condition in all three groups (apes, F2,46 = 33.30, p < 0.001; 1-year-
olds, F2,48 = 7.90, p < 0.01; and 3-year-olds, F2,48 = 18.27, p <
0.001). For 1-year-olds, a one-sample t test against chance (chance =
0.50) revealed that subjects were significantly above chance in all
conditions (p < 0.001) except feature (p > 0.4). The same pattern
was detected in apes: A one-sample t test against chance (chance =
0.33) revealed that subjects were significantly above chance in all
conditions (p < 0.001) except feature (p > 0.4). For 3-year-olds,
a one-sample t test against chance (chance = 0.33) revealed that
subjects were significantly above chance (p < 0.01) in all conditions
except place (p > 0.5). Descriptive statistics for all conditions in all
groups are summarized in the Supplemental Data. The p values
in all simple comparisons between the conditions reported here
and in the main text were calculated and a-level corrected with a
Bonferroni-Holm post-hoc test.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include Experimental Procedures, one figure,
one table, and one movie and are available with this article online
at: http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/16/17/1736/
DC1/.
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